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Understanding
Mine Clearance
in the Context of the
AP Mine Ban Convention
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
The States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, with the support of a wide range of international,
non-governmental and other organisations, have made great progress toward the achievement of their aim of clearing
all areas containing anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention. There is an ongoing need,
however, to ensure that national authorities, those charged with supporting their work and others involved in the
implementation of the Convention are clear regarding what Article 5 obliges States to do and what it does not,
what the understandings of the States Parties are concerning the implementation of Article 5, and what the
mech-anisms put in place related to fulfilment of Article 5 are and how they operate. The purpose of this guide is
to assist in meeting this need.
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The purpose of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
is to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel
mines. Returning all areas containing anti-personnel mines to a state fit for
normal human activity is necessary in order to realise this promise. The
Convention, accordingly, in Article 5, requires that each State Party under-
takes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.
During the 2004 First Review Conference of the Convention – the Nairobi
Summit on a Mine-Free World – the States Parties noted that the Convention’s
mine clearance obligation would be the most significant challenge to be
addressed in the succeeding five years. The States Parties therefore agreed
to intensify and accelerate efforts to ensure the most effective and expedi-
tious fulfilment of Article 5. 
In the years following the Nairobi Summit, the States Parties;
> recorded various understandings regarding the implementation of 
Article 5
> established mechanisms concerning extensions of mine clearance dead-
lines and the completion of implementation 
> embraced recommendations on the use of the full range of technical and 
non-technical methods to release suspected hazardous areas.
In recent years, the pursuit of the Convention’s mine clearance aim has
shown that implementation of Article 5 is indeed possible, and, for many,
that it is possible in years, not decades. This has been demonstrated by an
increasing number of States Parties reporting that all areas under their
jurisdiction, or control, that previously contained anti-personnel mines are
now fit for normal human activity. This achievement has been greatly aided
by technical and conceptual advances in the field of humanitarian demining





There is an ongoing need, however, to ensure that national authorities,
those charged with supporting their work and others involved in the imple-
mentation of the Convention, have a clear understanding of the following:
> what Article 5 obliges States to do and what it does not
> what conclusions the States Parties have adopted concerning the imple-
mentation of Article 5
> what the mechanisms related to fulfilment of Article 5 are and how they 
operate.
The purpose of this guide is to assist in meeting this need.
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At the Convention’s Tenth Meeting of the States Parties, Nicaragua’s Minister of Defence
Ruth Tapia, announced that Nicaragua had completed implementation of Article 5.
What does the Convention say?
Ratifying or acceding to an international treaty or convention is one of the
most profound exercises in State sovereignty. It implies that a State agrees
to be legally bound to act in accordance with certain norms that have been
accepted by the international community.
When a State agrees to be bound by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention,
it accepts that it shall never, under any circumstances, use, produce, stockpile
or transfer anti-personnel mines. However, in addition to accepting that there
are certain things that one must not do, States that have ratified or acceded to
the Convention also accept that there are certain things that States must do.
These positive obligations include taking a number of actions related to all
emplaced anti-personnel mines under a State’s jurisdiction or control.
In accordance with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention,
States have freely made a solemn and legally binding commitment to carry
out the following actions:
> Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction 
or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.1
> Each States Party shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter marked, monitored 
and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians,
until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed.2
> Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-
personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible
but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that 
State Party.3
What does Article 5 mean?
The States Parties have found the obligations contained in Article 5 to be
sufficiently clear. However, some actors outside of the Convention have
held, and sometimes propagated, misconceptions about what Article 5
means and whether it is realistic to implement. The States Parties began
addressing these misconceptions at the 2005 Sixth Meeting of the States
Parties (6MSP).




In the 6MSP’s Zagreb Progress Report, the States Parties recorded the fol-
lowing understandings:
> The Convention does not contain language that would require each State Party to 
search every square meter of its territory to find mines.4
This understanding discredits the myth that the Convention implies the
need for some search for a supposed “last landmine”. It also underscores the
point made in Article 5 of what truly is required of a State Party. As is noted
in a legal commentary on the Convention, the obligation to “make every effort
to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control…” is “narrower than an
obligation to identify all mined areas.” This provision of the Convention
could be construed as an obligation upon a mine-affected State to carry out
assessments and surveys defined and elaborated upon in the United
Nations’ International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).5
> It should be noted that while terms like “mine-free”, “impact-free”, and “mine-
safe” are sometimes used, such terms do not exist in the text of the Convention and 
are not synonymous with Convention obligations.6
This understanding highlights that while a variety of terms like “mine-free”,
“impact-free”, and “mine-safe” are often heard, these terms may be not uni-
versally defined or defined at all. In some instances, terms such “impact-
free” and “mine-safe” have been used to describe a milestone towards
fulfilment of Article 5 of the Convention but should not be confused with an
end-state. For public relations purposes, “mine-free” may be used as a short
reference to communicate that there are no areas in a particular location or
country are considered dangerous, due to the presence or suspected presence
of mines. However, when reporting on the strict fulfilment of the legal obli-
gations in the Convention, the use of this or other terms should be avoided.
> Clearance of all mined areas in accordance with Article 5 is part of the Convention’s 
overall comprehensive approach to ending the suffering and casualties caused by 
anti-personnel mines – “for all people, for all time”. The totality of the impacts 
caused by anti-personnel mines should be addressed in the context of the Convention. 
Anti-personnel mines, and the clearance of them, have/could have a humanitarian
impact, an impact on development, an impact on the disarmament goal of the 
Convention and an impact on solidifying peace and building confidence.7
This set of understandings is important for a variety of reasons. First, it
recalls that all mined areas need to be addressed in order that the
Convention can conclusively achieve its mission of an end to the suffering
and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines. Second, it implies that all
emplaced anti-personnel mines have potential impacts. And third, it sug-
gests, therefore, that a conclusively “impact-free” state can only be achieved
if the totality of impacts is addressed.
2. WHAT ARE THE CONVENTION’S MINE CLEARANCE
OBLIGATIONS?
What is the relationship between Article 5 and other Articles of the
Convention?
Article 5 does not exist in isolation but should be seen in the context of its
relationship to other Articles:
> Article 1, paragraph 1 sees that States Parties undertake, “never under 
any circumstances”, to use anti-personnel mines. Compliance with this 
provision of the Convention results at least in part from full implemen-
tation of Article 5.
> Article 1, paragraph 2 sees that States Parties undertake “to destroy or 
ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the 
provisions of the Convention.” This implies destruction of stockpiled 
anti-personnel mines, and it also includes undertaking to destroy or 
ensure the destruction of emplaced anti-personnel mines, in accordance 
with Article 5.
> Article 2, paragraph 5 defines a “mined area”. The term “mined area” 
appears several times in Article 5. The formal definition helps clarify the 
obligations contained in Article 5. It also provides the starting point for 
understanding when a State Party has completed implementation of 
Article 5.
> Article 7, paragraph 1.c obliges each State Party to report “the location 
of all mined areas that contain or are suspected to contain anti-personnel 
mines under its jurisdiction or control.”
> Article 7, paragraph 1.f obliges each State Party to report on “the status 
of programmes for the destruction of anti-personnel mines” in accordance
with Article 5.
> Article 7, paragraph 1.i obliges each State Party that has reported mined 
areas containing or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines to report 
on “the measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning 
to the population” in relation to all such areas.
> Article 19 indicates that “the Articles of this Convention are not subject 
to reservations”. This makes it clear that the provisions contained in 
Article 5 apply at all times and all locations under a State Party’s juris-
diction or control.
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2. WHAT ARE THE CONVENTION’S MINE CLEARANCE
OBLIGATIONS?
Article 1.1
Each State Party undertakes
“never under any circumstances”
to use anti-personnel mines.
Article 1.2
Each State Party undertakes 
“to destroy or ensure
the destruction of
all anti-personnel mines
in accordance with the provisions
of this Convention.”
Article 2.5
Defines a  “mined area”
as an area which is dangerous
due to the presence
or suspected presence of mines. 
Article 7.1.c
Each State Party shall report
“the location of all mined areas
that contain or are suspected
to contain anti-personnel mines
under its jurisdiction or control.”
Article 7.1.f
Each State Party shall report
on “the status of programmes
for the destruction of
anti-personnel mines” 
in accordance with Article 5.
Article 7.1.i
Each State Party shall report
on “measures taken to provide
an immediate and effective
warning to the population”
in accordance with Article 5.
Article 5
Each State Party undertakes to
destroy or ensure the destruction 
of all anti-personnel mines
in mined areas under
its jurisdiction or control.
Article 19
“The Articles of this Convention
shall not be subject to
reservations.”
Figure 1 | How article 5 of the Convention relates to other articles
The States Parties to the Convention have expressed that “primary respon-
sibility for ensuring compliance rests with each State Party.” This is not
only the case with respect to compliance with the Convention’s prohibitions,
but also for the implementation of Article 5. 
It is the responsibility of each individual State Party to declare that it does,
or does not have, obligations to fulfil in accordance with Article 5. The formal
means for a State Party to declare that it has Article 5 obligations is to
report, as required, in accordance with Article 7, “the location of all areas
that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines.” As of the
Convention’s 2009 Second Review Conference – the Cartagena Summit on a
Mine-Free World – 54 States Parties had, since the entry into force of the
Convention provided such information.
As of June 2010, 16  of the 54 States Parties that had reported that they had
been, or were still, required to implement Article 5, also reported that they
had completed implementation of the Article. 
However, what exactly does “completion” mean? A practical answer rests
in the definition of a “mined area” in Article 2 as “an area which is dangerous
due to the presence or suspected presence of mines”. That is “the implemen-
tation of Article 5 requires that States Parties render all such areas no longer
dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines”.8 
In simple terms, a State Party that has reported one or more areas that fit the
definition of “an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected
presence of mines” will know that it has completed Article 5 implementation
when it no longer has any area under its jurisdiction or control that “is dan-
gerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines”. At the Cartegena
Summit, the States Parties reiterated that completion “is indeed possible.
This has been demonstrated by State practice. Achieving this end state has
been greatly aided by the complete implementation of Article 5 that is pro-
vided through the United Nations’ International Mine Action Standards”.9
10
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3. WHAT IS COMPLETION OF THE CONVENTION’S
MINE CLEARANCE OBLIGATIONS?
Minelandia knows that it has an obligation to fulfil under Article 5.1 of the Convention because it has identified
four areas under its jurisdiction or control which, in a manner consistent with the definition of a “mined area”










Minelandia has completed implementation of Article 5.1 once it has done what it considers necessary
to ensure that what was once considered to be a “mined area” in accordance with Article 2.5 is no longer










Part I | Identification of Obligation
Part II | Implementation complete
Figure 2 | Completion of article 5 implementation
A State Party is minimally obliged to report completion simply by initially
reporting “an area or areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-
personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control”, Subsequently, the State
must furnish transparency information to indicate that the State Party in
question no longer considers that there is anything under its jurisdiction or
control that fits the definition of a “mined area” containing anti-personnel
mines.
A minimalist approach to reporting completion is problematic for three reasons:
> a State Party foregoes a chance to strengthen confidence, in the interna-
tional community, that it has fulfilled its legal obligations and, within its 
own population, that areas, once considered dangerous, are now once again
fit for normal human activity. 
> a State Party misses the opportunity to maximise the public relations 
benefits associated with completing a task in which it should take great 
pride. 
> “an increasing variety of statements about completion could promote 
uncertainty over fulfilment of this central Convention obligation”.10
To address these concerns, the States Parties at the 2006 Seventh Meeting
of the States Parties (7MSP) adopted a voluntary declaration of completion of
Article 5 obligations. This voluntary declaration was drafted to ensure consis-
tency among States Parties in reporting completion and to see that this
consistency is grounded in the legal text of the Convention. That is, the decla-
ration of completion sees that a State Party declares that it has done exactly
what the State Party has committed itself to doing, in accordance with
Article 5, paragraph 1. Ambiguous language and terminology, such as
“mine-free” or “impact free” is absent from this declaration.
The declaration of completion is realistic in enabling States Parties to express
that it is always possible that previously unknown mined areas may be disco-
vered, once completion has been declared. Furthermore, the declaration of
completion indicates the practical steps that a State Party would take, in
accordance with the Convention, should it, in fact, discover previously unk-
nown mined areas.
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[State] declares that it has destroyed [ensured the destruction of] all anti-personnel
mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines were
known or suspected to be emplaced, in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention.
[State] declares that it completed this obligation on [date].
In the event that previously unknown mined areas are discovered after this date,
[State] will:
(i) report such mined areas in accordance with its obligations under Article 7 and 
share such information through any other informal means such as the 
Intersessional Work Programme, including the Standing Committee meetings;
(ii) ensure the effective exclusion of civilians in accordance with Article 5; and
(iii) destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in these mined 
areas as a matter of urgent priority, making its needs for assistance known to 
other States Parties, as appropriate.
Confidence has grown because States Parties declaring completion have
used the declaration text to provide a comprehensive elaboration of steps
taken to reach a state of completion and to record what had been accompli-
shed. Some States Parties have provided a detailed narrative account of
their mine action programme. In addition, some have included a list of the
precise areas that contained, or were suspected to contain, anti-personnel
mines and the methods and means used to address these areas (See Annex
3). This, in turn, has become the basis for States Parties to reap public rela-
tions benefits associated with completing a significant task and, for many,
ending the landmine era in their country or region.
3. WHAT IS COMPLETION OF THE CONVENTION’S
MINE CLEARANCE OBLIGATIONS?
Text of the Declaration of Completion
This publication is not intended to be a technical manual on how to imple-
ment Article 5. 
However, it is impossible to divorce the international legal obligations,
freely accepted by the States Parties, from the operational efforts required
to fulfil these obligations. Perhaps most profoundly, ratification of, or accession
to, the Convention means that a State has defined the end point for its
humanitarian demining programme, at least as concerns anti-personnel mines. 
Beyond this, however, there are many other operational considerations that
flow from the legal obligations of the Convention and / or the understandings
adopted by the States Parties. 
Similarly, the advances made by humanitarian demining professionals have
helped inform understanding by the States Parties of what it means to imple-
ment Article 5, and how. 
The text of the Convention does not prescribe specifically how a State Party
should go about achieving a state of completion. The States Parties have,
however, benefited greatly from the dramatic evolution of humanitarian
demining, since the 1990s. It has provided them with the methods, means
and standards to give them confidence that they can render, and will know
when they have rendered, all mined areas no longer dangerous, due to the
presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines.
Land classification and information management
The Convention requires that a State Party report all “mined areas” that
contain anti-personnel mines, and, all “mined areas” that are suspected to
contain anti-personnel mines.
A “mined area” is “an area which is dangerous due to the presence or
suspected presence of mines”. The States Parties have also agreed that “the
implementation of Article 5 requires that States Parties render all such
areas no longer dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of
anti-personnel mines”. This has implications on how a State Party, which is
implementing Article 5, manages information, particularly on how it classifies
land or “area”. 
14
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To clearly indicate: 
> that a State Party has an Article 5 obligation 
> what the nature, extent and location of its obligation is 
> what it has done about it 
> what remains to be done
the State Party needs to be able to initially provide information on and then
progressively provide updated information on two things, at least:  
> the location of all “mined areas” that contain anti-personnel mines under 
its jurisdiction or control
> the location of all “mined areas” that are suspected to contain anti-
personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control. 
For operational purposes a national authority may wish to develop a more
sophisticated land classification system. However, no matter how simple or
sophisticated the land classification system, it must permit the national
authority to be able to derive information and report on all “mined areas”
that contain anti-personnel mines and all “mined areas” that are suspected
to contain anti-personnel mines.
A land classification system must also be unambiguous on what has been
completed and what remains to be addressed. The Convention is straight-
forward - a State Party must continue to fulfil Article 5 obligations, if there
are areas under its jurisdiction or control that it considers dangerous, due
to the presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines. Implementation,
with respect to any particular area, is complete if the State Party no longer
considers the area dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of
anti-personnel mines. A land classification system similarly should be une-
quivocal with no “grey area” between what is considered dangerous and
what is considered no longer dangerous.
4. HOW DO STATES PROCEED IN IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 5?
International standards
As noted, the Convention does not prescribe how Article 5 shall be
implemented. 
However, the international mine action community has developed the
framework for how humanitarian demining should be undertaken through
the United Nations International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The
IMAS serve as “a framework of standards and guidelines which, together,
harmonise the manner in which activities and tasks are conducted by the
different organizations and agencies involved”.11 These standards have been
developed to improve safety, efficiency and effectiveness in mine action, and
to promote a common and consistent approach to the conduct of mine
action operations. They assist national authorities in establishing national
standards and standing operating procedures.
It is generally accepted that Article 5 completion can occur, and be decla-
red, if humanitarian demining efforts are carried out in accordance with the
IMAS or relevant national standards based on the IMAS. The importance
of the IMAS has been acknowledged by the States Parties, including at the
2004 Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World. They agreed that States Parties in
the process of implementing Article 5 would “ensure and increase the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of their efforts”. This would be achieved partially by
“using the International Mine Action Standards as a frame of reference to
establish national standards and operational procedures in order to be of
benefit to national authorities in meeting their obligations under Article 5”.12
At the 2009 Cartagena Summit, their importance was again noted by the
States Parties expressing that “the implementation of Article 5 by some
States Parties, particularly as evidenced in the Article 5 extension requests
submitted by some, has again highlighted the value that States Parties derive
from the United Nations International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)”.13
The States Parties also recorded that “since the Nairobi Summit, the IMAS
have continued to be developed and widely accepted” and that “of the
States Parties that submitted requests for extensions of Article 5 deadlines
submitted in 2008 and 2009, 15 indicated that they have carried out mine
clearance and related activities using standards that have been based on the
IMAS”.
16
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Land release
Beginning in 2006 and continuing to 2008, the States Parties observed and
sought to address an issue facing many States Parties implementing Article
5. Imprecise identification and significant overestimation of the size of
mined areas has led to inappropriate allocations of time and resources. This
point was first recorded by the States Parties at the 7MSP’s Geneva Progress
Report where it was noted that “important advances in the understanding of
identifying mined areas… suggest that the challenges faced by many States
Parties may be less than previously thought” and that “some Landmine
Impact Surveys may have dramatically overstated the extent of the pro-
blem.”14
States Parties’ discussions on these matters culminated in the 2008 Ninth
Meeting of the States Parties (9MSP) formally “recognising the value of States
Parties making use of the full range of emerging practical methods to more
rapidly release, with a high level of confidence, areas suspected (to contain)
anti-personnel mines”. The States Parties also “warmly welcomed” a proposal
made by Norway “on the full, effective and expedient implementation of
Article 5”, and agreed to encourage States Parties, as appropriate, to imple-
ment the recommendations contained within this proposal.15
The Norwegian proposal to the 9MSP highlighted three key challenges
associated with imprecise and grossly overestimated identification of mined
areas:
a. Some States Parties have not made use of the full range of actions 
available to more accurately define suspected hazardous areas and 
are developing plans for Article 5 implementation that assume that 
technical surveys and manual or mechanical clearance methods are 
the only ones that will be used.
b. Some States Parties only recently have applied the full range of 
actions available to more accurately define suspected hazardous 
areas, resulting in several instances in a dramatic increase in the 
amount of previously suspected hazardous areas released.
c. In some States Parties, the full range of actions to more accurately 
define suspected hazardous areas have been used for several years, 
despite the absence of a national standard or policy.
4. HOW DO STATES PROCEED IN IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 5?
In response, the States Parties embraced the idea that three main actions
can be undertaken to release mined areas, as defined by the Convention:
a. Land can be released through non-technical means, such as syste-
matic community liaison, field based data gathering and improved 
procedures for cross-referencing data and updating databases.
b. Land can be released through technical survey, which is a detailed 
topographical and technical investigation of an area to identify a 
smaller area requiring clearance more precisely, thus enabling the 
release of the balance of the area investigated.
c. Land can be released through clearance, which is physically and 
systematically processing an area manually, or with machines, to a 
specified depth, in accordance with existing best practices, to ensure
the removal and destruction of all mines and other explosive hazards.
Certain “guiding principles” that should be taken into account in the deve-
lopment of national policies and standards, were also warmly welcomed:
a. A formal, well documented and recorded process for identifying 
mined areas. A credible investigation of the presence of mines that 
features… 
(a) thorough and well described methodology ensuring objective 
assessments
(b) input provided by a sufficient number of credible informants 
whose names and contact details are recorded
(c) quantified survey information
is a necessary precondition for being able to release land, without 
the deployment of technical means
b. Well defined and objective criteria for the reclassification of land: 
If land is to be reclassified, from a mined area to an area not deemed 
dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines, the 
criteria used need to be clear and universally understood. 
Reclassification can be based on qualitative (e.g., measures of confi-
dence in survey information) and quantitative measures
18
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c. A high degree of community involvement and acceptance of decision-
making. Local participation should be fully incorporated into the 
main stages of releasing land, in order to make the entire process 
more accountable, manageable and ultimately cost-effective. 
Community involvement should include vulnerable groups living in 
or near suspect areas. A high level of local contributions to major 
decisions will ensure that land is used appropriately after it has been 
released
d. A formal process of handover of land prior to the release of land. 
The involvement of local communities in the process leading to the 
release of land should be reinforced by a formal process of handing 
over land. It should include a detailed description of the survey 
methodology and the risk assessment. It should be signed by the 
future users of the land, local community authorities, representatives
from the organisation that carried out the assessment and the national
authorities
e. An ongoing monitoring mechanism after the handover has taken 
place. Post-release monitoring must be properly planned and agreed 
between the different parties to help measure the impact that land 
release has on local life, and to clarify issues related to liability and 
land status, in case of any subsequent landmine accidents. If accidents 
occur in, or mines are found in, released areas, such areas or portions 
of them may be reclassified as suspected mined areas or confirmed 
mined areas
f. A formal national policy addressing liability issues. National policies 
and standards on the release of land should detail the shift of liability 
from the mine action operator to the national, sub-national or local 
government or other entity.Mine action operators should be obliged 
to follow national policies and standards to be exempt from liability
g. A common set of terminology to be used when describing the process.
Many States Parties use different terminology to describe the same 
processes. Further development of the UN’s International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) may help provide a more advanced global set of 
terminology. If terms are used which could be interpreted in different 
ways these terms either should be clearly defined or not used at all.
4. HOW DO STATES PROCEED IN IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 5?
At the 2009 Cartagena Summit, the States Parties reiterated that “land released
through non-technical means, when undertaken in accordance with high
quality national policies and standards that incorporate various key principles
(including community involvement), it is not a short-cut to implementing
Article 5.1 but rather is a means to more expediently release, with confidence,
areas at one time deemed to be ‘mined areas’”.16 Also at the Cartagena
Summit, the States Parties noted the development of three new IMAS.
These facilitate the understanding and application of all available methods
to achieve the full, efficient and expedient implementation of Article 5.
> IMAS 08.20 explains the principles of land release and details the
responsibilities of donors, governments and operators in the context of 
land release. It further explains how the different components of survey 
and clearance should be viewed and how they can be combined to 
ensure efficient land release.
> IMAS 08.21 explains the principles of non-technical survey and how 
and when land can be released by it.
> IMAS 08.22 explains the principles of technical survey and how the 
requirement for it can be defined by building on evidence already gained 
through the non-technical survey process.
Ensuring the safety of populations
The Convention requires that States Parties report on “the measures taken
to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation
to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5”.17
In essence, States Parties are to take steps to ensure the safety of women,
girls, boys and men in areas under their control or jurisdiction, while they
proceed in rendering all mined areas no longer dangerous due to the
presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines. A degree of safety
can be assured by implementing the provisions contained in Article 5, para-
graph 2. These provisions call for States Parties to ensure that all mined
areas “are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing until all
anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed”. However, the
Convention does not prescribe exactly what should be done “to provide an
immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all (mined
areas)”. In fulfilling this requirement, States Parties have benefited from
evolutions in the field of mine risk education – or MRE.
At the Nairobi Summit, it was agreed that “States Parties that have reported
mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, where they have not yet
done so, will do their utmost to significantly reduce risks to populations and
hence reduce the number of new mine victims”.
20
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This will include “(ensuring) that mine risk education programmes are made
available in all communities at risk”.18 States Parties would also “ensure that
mine risk education programmes are made available in all communities at risk
to prevent mine incidents and save lives, promote mutual understanding
and reconciliation, and improve mine action planning, integrating such
programmes into education systems and broader relief and development
activities, taking into consideration age, gender, social, economic, political and
geographic factors, and ensuring consistency with relevant International
Mine Action Standards, as well as national mine action standards”.19
At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties updated their understanding of
MRE, noting that “the traditional view of MRE, as a one-way mass
communication of information, though still relevant and beneficial in emer-
gency situations and in isolated incidents where community awareness is
assessed as negligible, is no longer considered the best approach on its own
in most situations”. They also noted that “it is now generally accepted that
MRE is most effective when it is carried out as an integral part of mine
action and not in isolation from other mine action disciplines”.20
It has become clear that MRE activities provide important support to
efforts concerning mine clearance and victim assistance. This is through the
collection of information which supports mine action strategic thinking,
planning and priority setting. For instance, data collection, assessments and
analysis should be incorporated into ongoing programme planning, priority-
setting, implementation and the selection of tools and methodologies. In
addition, MRE should be tailored to the needs of individual contexts.
At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties also recognised that MRE is most
useful when delivered as part of general risk reduction and risk education
efforts. Sustained community participation and two-way communication is
essential. To ensure the most effective approach, a general assessment of the
risk faced by a community should be undertaken. This will identify whether
traditional MRE is required, scarce resources could best be allocated to
other risk reduction activities, and MRE can be delivered in conjunction
with other risk reduction activities. It will also ensure that the diverse risk
reduction needs of any given community are taken into account, and, that
approaches are adapted to different audiences through appropriate mes-
sages, techniques and mediums that take age and gender as well as social,
economic, political and geographical factors into consideration. 
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Gender and diversity
The States Parties have recognised for some time that there is a significant
gender dimension to mine action. The States Parties highlighted that this is
particularly relevant for the quality of implementation of Article 5 obliga-
tions, as women, girls, boys and men are differently affected by landmines.
States Parties have noted that “the integration of a gender perspective in
mine action should target and result in benefits for all members of society”.22
Some mine action operations now have solid experience of including both
women and men in mine clearance, which has strengthened such action. 
Inclusion of a gender perspective, for example through full participation of
all groups in a community in consultations on mine clearance, will also
enhance mine action by making it more efficient and effective. Challenges
remain in fully implementing this approach, but it was noted that culture
and tradition do not constitute the main obstacles to doing so. It is rather a
lack of knowledge and will that constitute the real barriers.
Resource mobilisation
Resource mobilisation for the implementation of Article 5 is not the sole
domain of national demining authorities. Cooperation to pursue the aims of
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention is a central component of the
Convention itself.
Article 6, paragraph 1 makes it clear that “in fulfilling its obligations under
this Convention, each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance,
where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible”. Article 6
continues in paragraph 4 to state that “each State Party in a position to do
so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities” and
indicates that assistance may be provided through a number of channels. 
Those providing assistance can channels funds in a number of ways and
those needing assistance have a variety of ways to request support. These
options include approaching other States on a bilateral basis or seeking with
the assistance of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) or the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Other cooperation part-
ners can include regional organisations such as the Organisation of American
States (OAS), other organisations including the International Trust Fund
for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), or non-governmental
organisations.
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What can a State Party do to enhance its ability to secure support?
At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties recorded that they “have come
to recognise that strong national ownership is essential for ensuring that
cooperation can flourish”. They also noted that “mine-affected States Parties
themselves have remarked that national ownership in the clearance of anti-
personnel mines and other explosive hazards implies, inter alia, the following
five components”: 
a. high level interest and leadership in fulfilling mine clearance obligations,
b. a national authority empowered, and provided with the human, financial
and material capacity, to carry out its responsibilities, 
c. a clear understanding of the size, location and quality of the Article 
5 implementation challenge or a commitment to promptly acquire such 
an understanding, 
d. a realistic but not unambitious plan to complete implementation of 
Article 5 as soon as possible and, 
e. a regular significant national financial commitment to the State’s own
humanitarian demining programme.”23
The States Parties noted that “while the existence of these components will
not guarantee that resources will flow in response to needs, demonstrating
national ownership makes it significantly more likely that cooperation will
flourish between those with needs and those in a position to provide assistance”.
The States Parties have discussed the link between mine action and develop-
ment for several years. It has been noted that “among the original reasons
put forward by States Parties promoting such a linkage was that it would
secure funding for Convention implementation over the long term by pla-
cing mine action within a greater budget from which funds could be obtai-
ned on a stable and ongoing basis.”24 The States Parties further noted that
efforts have been undertaken to assist bilateral and multilateral donors to
integrate mine action in their development programming.25 In addition,
mine-affected States Parties have made a commitment in Action #35 of the
Cartagena Action Plan to identify Article 5 implementation “as a priority in rele-
vant development goals and strategies.”
Article 5 implementation in the context of broader weapons contamination
Most States Parties implementing Article 5 have to contend with challenges
related to removing and destroying emplaced anti-personnel mines, as well
as the challenges associated with other explosive remnants of war. While
keeping in mind the obligation of a State Party, never under any circums-
tances, to use anti-personnel mines, the States Parties have been practically-
minded about priority setting, when addressing the breadth of weapons
contamination. 
24
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State practice has illustrated that States typically establish, and should
establish, priorities based on first tackling those challenges where the huma-
nitarian problems and socio-economic impact of explosive hazards is the
greatest, regardless of the type of munition. This point has been well articu-
lated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). At the June
2010 meeting of the Convention’s Standing Committee on Mine Clearance
the ICRC stated that “from a humanitarian perspective, prioritisation of
demining efforts should be made on the basis of the humanitarian impact of
the contaminated land and the risk undertaken by the civilian population
and not only on the basis of legal obligations to clear contaminated land”.
The States Parties have also recognised that, once a State Party has comple-
ted implementation of Article 5, it may still need to address other ongoing
weapons contamination issues. In this regard, the States Parties have noted
“that the lessons derived from fulfilling Article 5 obligations are applicable
in addressing related challenges associated with other explosive remnants of
war” and that “in many instances, the organisational structures, the capaci-
ties that have been built and the standards that have been established largely
as a result of the need to implement Article 5 are also being applied to
address weapons contamination more broadly”.26
In addition, those States Parties that have completed Article 5 implementation
may still need assistance in overcoming challenges associated with other
explosive hazards. For instance, in Action 40 of the Cartagena Action Plan, it
was agreed that States Parties in a position to do so will “in the spirit of the
Convention’s aims, endeavour to continue supporting States Parties that
have completed their Article 5 obligations in their efforts to address the
humanitarian consequences resulting from mine and explosive remnants of
war contamination”.
What is the Article 5 extensions process?
As noted, Article 5 sees that each State Party undertakes to destroy or
ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after
the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. 
However, unlike the time-bound obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-per-
sonnel mines, States Parties may ask for extra time to destroy emplaced
anti-personnel mines:
If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all
anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit
a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of
the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of
up to ten years.27
The Convention drafters were realistic in acknowledging that different
States would face different challenges. Some severely affected States would
require a great deal of time to complete implementation of Article 5.
Article 5, paragraph 4 documents what a request shall contain:
a. The duration of the proposed extension;
b. A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
i. The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining 
programmes;
ii. The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the 
destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
iii. Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all 
the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
c. The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the 
extension; and
d. Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
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The guidance contained in Article 5 is minimal. Given this, it was noted at
the 7MSP that “there is a need to clarify, and, decide as appropriate, key
elements of an extensions process”.28 The 7MSP ultimately agreed to establish
“a process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for
extensions to Article 5 deadlines”.29 The elements of this process are as follows:
> Requesting States Parties are encouraged, as necessary, to seek assistance
from the Implementation Support Unit in the preparation of their requests.
> States Parties seeking Article 5 extensions are encouraged to submit 
their requests to the current serving President of the States Parties or 
Review Conference, no fewer than nine months prior to the Meeting of 
the States Parties or Review Conference, at which the request decision 
would need to be taken.
> The President should inform the States Parties of the receipt of requests 
and make these openly available, in keeping with the Convention’s spirit 
of transparency.
> The President and the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs of the Standing 
Committees are tasked with preparing an analysis of each request indi-
cating, inter alia, clarifications of facts sought and received from the 
requesting State, demining plans for the extension period, and resource 
and assistance needs and gaps.
> In preparing an analysis of each request, the President, Co-Chairs and 
Co-Rapporteurs – and the requesting State – are to cooperate fully to 
clarify issues and identify needs. In addition, the President, Co-Chairs 
and Co-Rapporteurs, in close consultation with the requesting State 
Party should, where appropriate, draw on expert mine clearance, legal 
and diplomatic advice, using the Implementation Support Unit to provide
support.
> The President, acting on behalf of the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs, 
should submit the analysis of each request to the States Parties well 
before (i.e., approximately eight weeks) the Meeting of the States Parties
or Review Conference preceding the requesting State Party’s deadline.
> Finally, in recognition of the additional burden taken on by the 
Implementation Support Unit in supporting the analysis process, States 
Parties, in a position to do so, are encouraged to provide additional 
funds to the ISU.
How does the Article 5 extensions process work?
At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties recorded one of the main benefits
that resulted from the adoption of a process on Article 5 extension requests:
The process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extensions
of Article 5 deadlines has led to the establishment of an orderly and predictable calendar
for submitting, analysing and considering requests for extensions of Article 5 deadlines.
It is implied that a State Party that believes it will be unable to destroy or ensure the
destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas that it has reported by its deadline
should submit its request in advance of the last Meeting of the States Parties or Review
Conference prior to its deadline.30
In recent years, Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences have
taken place in late November / early December. This implies that, if a State
Party, with a deadline the following year, believes it will need more time to
implement Article 5, it should submit its request no later than 31 March of
the year of the Meeting of the States Parties or Review Conference, prior
to its deadline. For a high quality request to be submitted, the State Party
should begin preparing its request approximately one year before the requi-
red submission date. 
The Article 5 extensions process was used for the first time in 2008. One of
the first steps in this new process, taken by the President and the Co-Chairs
and the Co-Rapporteurs in 2008, was to develop working methods for the
analysis process. The complete set of working methods was documented in
the report submitted to the 9MSP by the President of the Eighth Meeting
of the States Parties (8MSP).31 Some of the highlights of these methods,
which have since been applied in a uniform manner, were recorded by the
States Parties at the Cartagena Summit:32
> The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine 
Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, with the support of their 
Co-Rapporteurs, have enhanced the efficiency of the process. They make
an initial determination of the completeness of requests and immediately 
seek additional information which is necessary for a complete analysis.
> Expertise to assist in the analysis process can be obtained from a variety 
of sources and in various forms. The expertise of the ICBL, the ICRC and 
the United Nations has been called upon, given the broad scope of these 
organisations’ expertise. The ICRC’s views on legal matters have been 
sought. Expert input on demining and other techniques to release sus-
pected hazardous areas has been called for and provided by the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). In addition, 
input from leading humanitarian demining operators has been requested 
and provided.
28
5. WHAT HAPPENS IF A STATE PARTY NEEDS MORE TIME TO 
IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 5?
29
5. WHAT HAPPENS IF A STATE PARTY NEEDS MORE TIME TO 
IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 5?
> With respect to conflicts of interest, the President asks members of the 
analysing group to excuse themselves from the analysis of their own 
requests or the analysis of a request with which they have a conflict of 
interest, such as a territorial or sovereignty dispute with the requesting 
State Party.
> Based on the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Convention and 
relevant decisions of Meetings of the States Parties, an Article 5 Analysing 
Group Extension Request Checklist has been developed. (See Annex 4.) 
This has helped analysing group members to structure their input and to 
ensure that each request is treated in a uniform manner, according to the 
same principles, taking into account its own particular characteristics.
> Those leading the effort to analyse requests have done so on the basis that 
the analysis process should be a cooperative one. It should ultimately 
lead, in many circumstances, to improved revised requests being submitted 
and to the possibility of decisions taken in an orderly manner at Meetings
of the States Parties and Review Conferences. For instance, Presidents, 
who have chaired the group of States Parties mandated with analysing 
requests, have engaged in a dialogue with requesting States Parties. 
They have written to seek additional clarifications of various matters, 
offered advice on ways to improve requests and invited representatives 
of all requesting States Parties to an informal discussion with the analysing
group.
> Those leading the effort to analyse requests have sought to conclude 
their work eight to ten weeks prior to the Meetings of the States Parties 
or Review Conferences when requests would be formally considered. 
Requesting States Parties have been asked to submit, in the same time 
frame, a final two to five page executive summary of their requests. 
These should contain an overview of information necessary for an informed
decision to be taken, with these executive summaries translated and with 
detailed requests made available in their original languages.
> It has been concluded that the analysing group should aim for consensus 
in all aspects of the analysis process. In 2008, the analysing group adopted
the analyses on requests submitted by consensus. It has been further 
understood that, should there be differences of views regarding analyses, 
a variety of methods for taking decisions on analyses and / or for incor-
porating differing points of view of analysis exist. 
It should also be noted that once an analysis has been finalised, the reques-
ting State Party has been provided with an opportunity to offer comments,
particularly to correct points of fact. The President then submits the analy-
sis as a formal document of the Meeting of the States Parties or Review
Conference and the work of the analysing group is complete.
At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties recorded several important
observations about the Article 5 extensions process. It was noted, for ins-
tance, that the comments made by States Parties in their requests, including
annual projections of progress to be made during extension periods, had
become “important means for States Parties to measure progress in the
implementation of Article 5.”33 Decisions taken by the States Parties point
to requesting States Parties being asked “to provide updates relative to their
accounting of remaining mined area and / or annual benchmarks for progress
at meetings of the Standing Committees, at Meetings of the States Parties
and at Review Conferences”.34
At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties also observed that, if a State
Party does not have a clear picture of the nature and extent of its Article 5
implementation challenge, it may request only the amount of time necessary
to acquire the information required. It will subsequently submit a second
extension request containing a complete plan and timeline for implementation.35
In particular the Cartagena Summit “highlighted the value of States Parties
requesting only the period of time necessary to gather and assess data on
landmine contamination and other relevant information with a view to
developing a meaningful forward looking plan based on this information.”
For instance, the States Parties have noted that while “it may be unfortunate,
that after almost ten years since entry into force, a State Party is unable to
specify how remaining work will be carried out”, it is positive when such a
State Party requests only the time it needs to “garner an understanding of
the true remaining extent of the challenge and develop plans accordingly
that precisely project the amount of time that will be required to complete
Article 5 implementation”.35
At the Cartagena Summit it was noted that “some requesting States Parties
have seized upon the opportunity presented through an extension request to
reinvigorate national and international interest in their national demining
programmes, in large part by demonstrating national ownership and that
implementation is possible in a relatively short period of time”.36 The extension
request process is a chance for a State Party implementing Article 5 to take
stock, in a comprehensive manner, of what has been completed and what
remains to be done. It provides the State Party with an opportunity to
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involve all stakeholders in order to benefit from their input and experience.
And, it enables the requesting State Party to build confidence regarding its
commitment to complete Article 5 implementation.
How are decisions taken on Article 5 extension requests?
Once the President and the Co-Chairs and the Co-Rapporteurs of the
Standing Committees have completed their work, it rests with all States
Parties at a Meeting of the States Parties or Review Conference to take
decisions on requests. In terms of the formal consideration of requests,
Article 5, paragraph 5states the following:
> The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into 
consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by 
a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request 
for an extension period.
The States Parties have understood the seriousness of formal consideration
extension requests and the need for this to be dealt with in an effective
manner at their Meetings of the States Parties and Review Conferences. In
this regard, they have used the following practice to formally consider
requests at their meetings:
> Usually on the first day of a Meeting of the States Parties or Review 
Conference, each requesting State Party is asked to make a presentation 
on the key aspects of its extension request. Following each presentation, 
the outgoing President presents the analyses of the request. All delegations
then have a chance to ask questions and make comments.
> In the days following the presentation of requests, the President consults 
with interested delegations on requesting States Parties on draft decision
language.
> Usually on the last day of a meeting, the States Parties formally consider
and take decisions on requests.
In terms of how decisions are taken, it should be recalled that Article 5,
paragraph 5 states that Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences
shall “decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting
whether to grant the request for an extension period.” 
In communicating with the States Parties in advance of the 24-28 November
2008 Ninth Meeting of the States Parties, the then President-Designate
wrote that “certainly general agreement on requests would be preferable.
However, should the States Parties need to resort to a voting procedure, the
rules of procedure are clear in terms of what needs to be done”.37 The relevant
section of the rules of procedure reads as follows: 
Decisions concerning destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accor-
dance with Article 5 of the Convention and facilitation and clarification of
compliance in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention shall be made according 
to the provisions of those Articles.38
The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consi-
deration the factors contained in paragraph 4 (of Article 5 of the Convention), 
assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and 
voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.39
The Meeting of the States Parties shall normally vote by show of hands or by
standing, but any representative may request a roll-call. The roll-call shall be 
taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the States participating in 
the Meeting of the States Parties, beginning with the delegation whose name is 
drawn by lot by the President.40
To date, there has been general agreement on the decisions related to all
requests considered.
What decisions are taken on requests?
Article 5 is clear in indicating that, if a State Party believes that it cannot
complete implementation by its deadline, it may submit a request for more
time – for a period of up to ten years. It is the responsibility of all States
Parties then to take a decision on this request. The States Parties must
decide “yes” or “no” with respect to requests. They have, however, accepted
that Article 5, paragraph 5 does not exclude the possibility of the Meeting
of the States Parties complementing a “yes” or “no” decision on a request
with additional decisions related to the request.
For instance, the States Parties have normally drawn from the analysis of
requests in order to take supplementary decisions with respect to both indi-
vidual requests and all requests considered at a particular meeting. Often
these decisions refer to commitments made by States Parties to take certain
actions during the requested extension period, and to regularly report on
progress. In some instances, decisions have expressed the desirability of
States Parties proceeding with implementation faster than suggested in
requests.
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i. The Meeting assessed the request submitted by Chad for an extension of Chad’s 
deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
in accordance with article 5.1, agreeing to grant the request for an extension 
until 1 January 2014. 
ii. In granting the request, the Meeting noted that, as Chad had not complied with 
the commitment it had made, as recorded by the Ninth Meeting of the States 
Parties, to garner an understanding of the true remaining extent of the challenge 
and to develop plans accordingly that precisely project the amount of time that 
will be required to complete Article 5 implementation, it would appear that 
Chad does not possess much more knowledge now than it did in 2008 to develop
a plan to meet its Article 5 obligations.
iii. Also in granting the request, the Meeting noted that, as Chad has made it clear 
that the provision of external support is necessary to fully implement the plan 
contained within its request, Chad could inspire greater confidence on the part 
of those in a position to provide assistance by providing as soon as possible clarity 
regarding the remaining scope of the problem and give consideration to the trans-
formation of its national demining authority towards a more civilian organisation. 
iv. Also in granting the request, the Meeting noted that while it may be unfortunate 
that after almost twelve years since entry into force a State Party is unable to 
specify how much work remains and how it will be carried out, it is positive that 
Chad intends to renew efforts to garner an understanding of the true remaining 
extent of the challenge and develop plans accordingly. In this context, the Meeting
noted the importance of Chad requesting only the period of time necessary to assess
relevant facts and develop a meaningful forward looking plan based on these facts. 
The Meeting further noted that, by requesting a three year extension, Chad was 
projecting that it would need approximately three years from the date of submission
of its request to obtain clarity regarding the remaining challenge, produce a 
detailed plan and submit a third extension request. 
v. Also in granting the request, the Meeting noted that the commitments made in 
Chad’s 2010-2012 work plan would greatly assist Chad and all States Parties 
in assessing progress in implementation during the extension period. The Meeting 
noted in particular the commitments made by Chad to review its strategic plan 
at the beginning of 2012 on the basis of an analysis of the final results of survey
efforts. In this regard the Meeting noted that it would be beneficial if Chad 
presented to the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties, in 2012, a revised strategic
plan as a precursor to Chad submitting, no later than 31 March 2013, a third 
extension request that would be comprehensive in clarifying the remaining challenge
and that would contain a detailed annual implementation plan leading to completion.
In this regard, the Meeting requested Chad, in accordance with Action 13 of the 
Cartagena Action Plan, to provide updates relative to these and other commitments
at meetings of the Standing Committees and at Meetings of the States Parties.
Examples of Decision Language Decisions taken by the Tenth Meeting of the States
Parties with respect to the Article 5 extension request submitted by Colombia:
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i. The Meeting assessed the request submitted by Colombia for an extension of 
Colombia’s deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas in accordance with article 5.1, agreeing to grant the request for an 
extension until 1 March 2021.
ii. In granting the request, the Meeting noted that, while it is understandable that 
Colombia has asked for the maximum time available given the extent of the 
known or suspected contamination problem, Colombia is doing so based on an 
incomplete picture. In order to attain a better picture of the situation, the 
Meeting requested Colombia to provide additional clarity to the Eleventh Meeting 
of the States Parties, in 2011, regarding what areas are in the process of 
“Democratic Consolidation” and what areas currently provide the necessary 
security conditions to carry out humanitarian demining tasks, as well as the 
provision of more information concerning these areas. 
iii. Also in granting the request, the Meeting noted that, after almost ten years since 
entry into force, Colombia does not have the information in place to report in a
more precise manner on the location of areas known or suspected to contain anti-
personnel mines and hence to develop an implementation plan based on concrete 
information. In this context, the Meeting requested Colombia to provide an update
to the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties on steps that are being taken to 
develop and implement more effective methods to determine the actual location 
and size of suspected hazardous area in municipalities where this may be possible.
iv. Also in granting the request, the Meeting noted that, given the extremely ambitious
resource mobilisation projections and given the importance of a sustained high level
of external support, Colombia could benefit from developing as soon as possible 
a resource mobilisation strategy which included clarity regarding its national 
commitment during the extension period. 
v. Also in granting the request, the Meeting noted that, given the activities Colombia
is undertaking initially in 14 municipalities during the period 2011 to 2013 as 
well as other efforts to more closely define the level of contamination, and, given 
that Colombia has defined specific objectives for the development of methodologies
to support  mine clearance operations by its armed forces and civilian organizations,
Colombia should have a much clearer understanding of the location and nature 
of contamination by the end of that period as well as on steps that can be taken 
to address this contamination. The Meeting also noted that Colombia has provided
a clearance plan only for the period 2011 to 2013. In this context, the Meeting 
requested Colombia to present to the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties, 
in 2013, a revised implementation plan that contains and takes into account a 
clearer and more substantiated understanding of the location and nature of 
contamination and that includes revised annual projections of which areas would 
be addressed when and how. In addition, the Meeting requested Colombia, in 
accordance with Action 13 of the Cartagena Action Plan, to provide updates 
relative to these and other commitments at meetings of the Standing Committees,
at Meetings of the States Parties and at Review Conferences.
Examples of Decision Language Decisions taken by the Tenth Meeting of the States
Parties with respect to the Article 5 extension request submitted by Colombia:
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Finally, it should be recalled that, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph
6, “an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in
accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article” , and that “in requesting
a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional
information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period
pursuant to this Article”.
How does a State Party prepare a request?
As noted, in the establishment of an Article 5 extensions process, it was
agreed that requesting States Parties should seek the support of the
Implementation Support Unit in the preparation of their requests. The ISU
has developed a methodology for advising States Parties on preparing
requests, which usually involves the following steps:
> Approximately one year prior to the targeted date for request submission,
the ISU will seek to meet with the national authority of the State Party 
in question and support the national authority in convening a workshop 
involving other stakeholders. This is to ensure that all relevant officials 
and stakeholders are well aware of the extensions process, generate 
ideas on how to make good use of the process and to develop a time-line 
for completing the request. 
> The national authority should also begin compiling information and 
organising it, consistent with the Suggested outline for preparing Article 5 
extension requests. This was attached to the final report of the Cartagena 
Summit. (See Annex 5). The highest priority should be placed on acquiring
necessary information to comprehensively – in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms – answer the following three basic questions:
> What was the original Article 5 implementation challenge?
> What has been accomplished with respect to it since entry into force?
> What remains to be done to complete implementation of Article 5?
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> Approximately eight months prior to the targeted date for submitting a 
request, the ISU will seek to meet with the national authority of the 
requesting State Party to discuss efforts to provide information relative 
to the above-mentioned questions. In some instances, answering these 
questions has highlighted inadequacies regarding information in the 
national authority’s possession, on the original and present location and 
size of mined areas and problems in information management. If this is 
the case, the requesting State Party may wish to consider taking actions 
to improve its understanding of the true remaining extent, location and 
nature of the implementation challenge.
> A State Party should prepare the forward-looking aspects of the request 
– the plan to address the remaining challenge and the amount of time 
required to do so – only after there is sufficient clarity regarding the 
remaining extent, location and nature of the implementation challenge.
> The ISU remains at the disposal of requesting States Parties to comment 
on drafts and to advise on the level of detail that is generally desired. 
Many requesting States Parties have also benefited greatly from the 
ongoing support by in-country expertise from the United Nations and 
by drawing on the input from demining operators in a particular country.
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> In keeping with the timeline implied by the agreed Article 5 extensions 
process, States Parties should submit requests by 31 March in the year 
when their requests would be formally considered. Requesting States 
Parties should be prepared to possibly revise their requests after consul-
tation with those States Parties mandated to analyse the requests. 
> Following the submission of its request, the State Party in question 
should present, to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, the main 
aspects of its request. Serious concerns that delegations may have with 
the request, will generally be highlighted at this time. The requesting 
State Party may wish to have a dialogue with any delegation that has 
expressed concerns.
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Why must and should a State Party report?
Reporting on the implementation of Article 5 is a legal obligation. It is also
an opportunity - good reporting, in accordance with Article 7 transparency
provisions, can become the basis for efficiently meeting all of a State Party’s
other information needs. Clear and comprehensive reports can also help
support resource mobilisation efforts, by communicating the magnitude of
the challenge faced, the steps that have been taken to specify the location of
mined areas and progress achieved to date.
What must a State Party report?
Each State Party is obliged to report to the Convention’s depository – the
United Nations Secretary General – no later than 180 days after the Convention
enters into force for a particular State Party - on a variety of matters on the
aim of clearing all areas containing anti-personnel mines. States Parties are
then obliged to provide updated information on these matters annually,
covering the previous calendar year. Pertinent matters include the following:
> To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected 
to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much 
detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel 
mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced.41
This obligation, initially, can provide the the starting point in showing the
size of the implementation challenge.at the entry into force. Thereafter, it
can provide a measure, relative to this baseline, of what has been accompli-
shed on a regular basis. In practice, States Parties implementing Article 5
regularly increase their knowledge on the existence and location of mined
areas. However, the basic logic of the obligation remains: it is a snapshot in
time of the magnitude of a State Party’s remaining challenge and a measure
of what has been accomplished since a previous report.
At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties made the following two commit-
ments in the Cartagena Action Plan that pertain to and provide guidance
regarding this reporting obligation:
> States Parties that are in the process of implementing Article 5 “will 
do their utmost to (…) identify, if they have not yet done so, the precise
perimeters and locations, to the extent possible, of all areas under 
their jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known 
or are suspected to be emplaced, report this information as required 
by Article 7 (…), and incorporate the information into national 
action plans and relevant broader development and reconstruction 
plans”. 
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> States Parties that are in the process of implementing Article 5 “will 
do their utmost to (…) “provide annually, in accordance with Article 
7, precise information on the number, location and size of mined 
areas, anticipated particular technical or operational challenges, plans
to clear or otherwise release these areas and information on the areas 
already released, disaggregated by release through clearance, technical 
survey and nontechnical survey.”
> The status of programmes for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in 
accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used 
in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and 
environmental standards to be observed.42
This obligation combines, in one sentence, reporting on the destruction of
stockpiled anti-personnel mines and on the destruction of emplaced mines.
The efforts required to accomplish these two tasks are quite different.
Reports submitted should separate “programmes” for destroying stockpiled
anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 4, and “programmes” for
implementing Article 5. 
The obligation refers to “including details of the methods” used in imple-
mentation. This provides States Parties with an opportunity to provide in-
depth information on ways and means used to implement Article 5. States
Parties, in a manner consistent with Action #15 of the Cartagena Action Plan,
may wish to use this reporting requirement to share information on “developing
and implementing applicable national standards, policies and procedures
for releasing land through technical and non-technical means that are
accountable and acceptable to local communities, including through the
involvement of women and men in the acceptance process”.
> The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into 
force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity 
of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, 
respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of antipersonnel mine 
in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4.43
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This obligation combines, reporting on the destruction of stockpiled anti-
mines and on the destruction of emplaced mines. Clearly the information
provided on numbers and types of emplaced anti-personnel mines is only
useful as a complement to detailed and complete reporting on remaining
mined areas and on programmes to render these areas no longer dangerous.
> The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population
in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.44
In accordance with Action #19 of the Cartagena Action Plan, States Parties
implementing Article 5 may wish to report on efforts to “provide mine risk
reduction and education programmes, as part of broader risk assessment
and reduction activities targeting the most at-risk populations, which are
age-appropriate and gender-sensitive, coherent with applicable national and
international standards, tailored to the needs of mine-affected communities
and integrated into ongoing mine action activities, in particular data gathering,
clearance and victim assistance as appropriate”.
It should be noted that some States Parties have authorised entities to retain
anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes – “for the development of and
training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques”.45
Each State Party that has done so also has an obligation to provide infor-
mation on the following:
> The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained
(…) for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine 
destruction techniques (…) as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party 
to retain (…) anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article.
In fulfilling this obligation, States Parties may wish to take into account that
at the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed in the Cartagena Action Plan that States
Parties that have retained anti-personnel mines for permitted reasons will:
> Regularly review the number of anti-personnel mines retained to 
ensure that they constitute the minimum number absolutely necessary
for the purposes permitted by the Convention and destroy all those 
exceeding that number and where appropriate explore available 
alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and 
research activities. (Action 56)
> Annually report, on a voluntary basis, on the plans for and actual use 
of anti-personnel mines retained, explain any increase or decrease in 
the number of retained anti-personnel mines. (Action 57)
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In addition, in Action #58 of the Cartagena Action Plan it was agreed that States
Parties that have maintained the same number of retained anti-personnel
mines over periods of years, and have not reported on the use of such mines
for permitted purposes or on concrete plans for their use would be encoura-
ged “to report on such use and such plans and to review whether these anti-
personnel mines are needed and constitute the minimum number absolutely
necessary for permitted purposes and to destroy those that are in excess of
this number”.
What are other instances when States Parties report?
In addition to fulfilling their legal obligations to report on the implementation
of Article 5, States Parties are either formally or informally requested to
provide information on Article 5 implementation at Meetings of the States
Parties, Review Conferences and meetings of the Standing Committees.
This is particularly pertinent for States Parties that have been granted
extensions on deadlines for implementing Article 5.
In submitting requests for extensions on Article 5 deadlines, States Parties
have both provided a baseline of what remains to be cleared or released
during the extension period and made commitments regarding what they
would do when, during this period. 
Decisions on requests typically have taken note of this. At the Ninth Meeting
of the States Parties, for example, requesting States Parties were encouraged
“to provide updates relative to their accounting of remaining mined areas
and / or annual benchmarks for progress at meetings of the Standing
Committees, at the Second Review Conference and at Meetings of the
States Parties”. In addition, decision language can reflect a specific time
bound commitment to report by a specific State Party. For instance, the
decisions on the request submitted by the United Kingdom referenced the
agreement by the United Kingdom “to provide as soon as possible, but not
later than 30 June 2010, a detailed explanation of how demining is proceeding
and the implications for future demining….”
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At the Cartagena Summit the importance of regular reporting by States Parties
that have been granted extensions was also acknowledged. In Action 13 of
the Cartagena Action Plan, it was agreed that “States Parties that have been
granted an extension to their initial Article 5 deadline will… complete
implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible but not later than their
extended deadlines, ensure progress toward completion proceeds in accordance
with the commitments made in their extension requests and the decisions
taken on their requests, and report regularly on such progress to the mee-
tings of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education
and Mine Action Technologies, Meetings of the States Parties and Review
Conferences”. 
In addition to regular reporting by States Parties that have been granted
extensions, typically all other States Parties still in the process of implemen-
ting Article 5 are encouraged to provide updates on their efforts at meetings
of the Standing Committees and at Meetings of the States Parties.
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Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel
mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit
the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe
consequences for years after emplacement,
Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated
manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the
world, and to assure their destruction,
Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, inclu-
ding the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,
Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important
confidence-building measure,
Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet
done so,
Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December
1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international
agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, 
Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and
multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling,
production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as
evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts
to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental orga-
nizations around the world, 
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Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27
June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally
binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-
personnel mines, 
Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention,
and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all
relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament,
regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of
the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimi-
ted, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, pro-
jectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civi-
lians and combatants, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 |  General obligations
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
a. To use anti-personnel mines;
b. To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to 
anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c. To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-
personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
Article 2 |  Definitions
1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, 
proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or 
more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or 
contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling 
devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or 
other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person or a vehicle.
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3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is 
part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when 
an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine. 
4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines 
into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, 
but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel 
mines.
5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected 
presence of mines.
Article 3 |  Exceptions
1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer 
of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine 
detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The 
amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary 
for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
Article 4 |  Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the
destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under
its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry
into force of this Convention for that State Party.
Article 5 |  Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-
personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as
possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention 
for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction
or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced 
and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by 
fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-
personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall 
at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 
1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
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3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction
of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it 
may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for 
an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel 
mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
a) The duration of the proposed extension;
b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
i. The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining 
programs;
ii. The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the 
destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and 
iii. Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all 
the anti-personnel mines in mined areas; 
c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the 
extension; and
d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension. 
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into 
consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide 
by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the 
request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in 
accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further 
extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on 
what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this 
Article.
Article 6 |  International cooperation and assistance
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right 
to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the 
extent possible.
2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate 
in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and techno-
logical information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States 
Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance 
equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and 
rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for 
mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through 
the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or 
institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross 
and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental 
organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
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4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance
and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the 
United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-
governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contri-
buting to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine 
Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining. 
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction
of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.
6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine 
clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information 
concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of 
experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance. 
7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other 
States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora 
to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to 
determine, inter alia:
a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the 
implementation of the program;
c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or 
deaths;
e) Assistance to mine victims;
f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and 
the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities 
that will work in the implementation of the program. 
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article 
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Article 7 |  Transparency measures
1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as 
soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into 
force of this Convention for that State Party on:
a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or 
under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity 
and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are
suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to 
include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each 
type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines 
retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, 
mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose 
of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to 
retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3; 
e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-
personnel mine production facilities;
f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance
with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in 
destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and 
environmental standards to be observed;  
g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry 
into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of 
the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance 
with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of 
each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance 
with Article 4;
h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, 
to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, 
giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may
facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, 
this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic
content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine 
clearance; and
i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the 
population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the 
States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports 
received to the States Parties.
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Article 8 |  Facilitation and clarification of compliance
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the 
implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a 
spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations
under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating
to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it 
may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for 
Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accom-
panied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from 
unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State 
Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State 
Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-
General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to 
the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter 
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the 
States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the 
submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request 
for Clarification, to all States Parties.  All such information shall be presented to 
the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.  
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States 
Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider
the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall there upon commu-
nicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned,
to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a 
Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. 
In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least 
one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States 
Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a 
majority of States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, 
as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, 
taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. 
The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties 
shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to 
that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority 
of States Parties present and voting.
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7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or 
the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfillment of its review of the 
matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with 
paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the 
Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and 
decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any 
time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. 
Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States 
Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. 
The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accor-
dance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot 
or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the juris-
diction or control of the requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the 
names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by 
States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on 
this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a 
State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-
acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the 
territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting 
State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the 
expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special 
Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, 
after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the 
mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-
finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. 
The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities 
under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.
11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall 
arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The 
requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to 
receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for 
ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they 
are on territory under its control.
12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-
finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the 
necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on 
the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the 
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13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding 
mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be 
able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.
14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all 
areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance 
issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements 
that the requested State Party considers necessary for:
a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party 
may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other 
constitutional rights; or
c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.
In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall 
make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its
compliance with this Convention. 
15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned
for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless 
otherwise agreed.
16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of 
the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.
17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of 
the States Parties the results of its findings. 
18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties 
shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-
finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to 
address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested 
State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.
19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties 
may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify 
or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate 
procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue 
at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the 
requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting 
of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of 
cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.
20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties 
shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 
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Article 9 |  National implementation measures
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures,
including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibi-
ted to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under
its jurisdiction or control.
Article 10 |  Settlement of disputes
1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute 
that may a rise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this 
Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of 
the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the 
dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good 
offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement 
procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation 
and clarification of compliance.
Article 11 |  Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with 
regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
a) The operation and status of this Convention;
b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this 
Convention; 
c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The first Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this 
Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference. 
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may 
be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed 
Rules of Procedure. 
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Article 12 |  Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review 
Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if 
so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between 
Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to 
this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the 
States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11; 
c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 
5; and
d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implemen-
tation of this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may 
be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the 
agreed Rules of Procedure.
Article 13 |  Amendments
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may
propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall 
be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties 
and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be 
convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the 
Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further 
consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment 
Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may 
be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with 
the agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the 
States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties 
request that it be held earlier.
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4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds 
of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The 
Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to 
this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of 
instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall 
enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its
instrument of acceptance.
Article 14 |  Costs
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the 
States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be 
borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating
therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted 
appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 
7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States 
Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted 
appropriately.
Article 15 |  Signature
This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signa-
ture at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997,
and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its
entry into force.
Article 16 |  Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the 
Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be 
deposited with the Depositary. 
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Article 17 |  Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after 
the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the 
first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Article 18 |  Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare
that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its
entry into force.
Article 19 |  Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.
Article 20 |  Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to 
withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all 
other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security 
Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the 
reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument
of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month 
period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal
shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect 
the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any
relevant rules of international law.
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Article 21 |  Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of
this Convention.
Article 22 |  Authentic texts 
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
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Total land requiring clearance
at entry into force, as defined
in Article 2, paragraph 5
Estimated land remaining to be
cleared, in accordance with
Article 5 paragraph 4.b.i
Amount of time requested,
in accordance with Article 5,
paragraph 4.a
Circumstances which impeded
the ability of the requesting
state party to fulfil its obligations,
in accordance with Article 5
paragraph 4.b.iii
Annual projections of mined areas
to be released, in accordance
with Article 5 paragraph 4.b.i
Methods to be used to render
mined areas no longer dangerous,
in accordance with Article 5,
paragraph 4.b.i and Article 5,
paragraph 4.b.ii
National financial resources
required, in accordance with
Article 5, paragraph 4.b.ii
International financial resources
required, in accordance with
Article 5, paragraph 4.b.ii
Humanitarian, social, economic and
environmental implications of
the extension, in accordance with
Article 5, paragraph 4.c
Any other information relevant to
the request, in accordance with





OUTLINE FOR PREPARING AN ARTICLE 5 EXTENSION REQUEST
I. Executive Summary
This could be 2-5 pages long, summarising the essential details required in accordance
with Article 5, paragraph 4 and containing any other essential information which the
requesting State Party would want to quickly and efficiently communicate.
II. Detailed Narrative
1. Origins of the Article 5 implementation challenge
2. Nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects
3. Nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge: qualitative aspects
4. Methods used to identify areas containing AP mines and reasons for suspecting the 
presence of AP mines in other areas
5. National demining structures
6. Nature and extent of progress made: quantitative aspects
7. Nature and extent of progress made: qualitative aspects
8. Methods & standards used to release areas known or suspected to contain AP mines
9. Methods & standards of controlling and assuring quality
10. Efforts undertaken to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from mined areas
11. Resources made available to support progress made to date
12. Circumstances that impede compliance in a 10 year period
13. Humanitarian, economic, social and environmental implications
14. Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects
15. Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: qualitative aspects
16. Amount of time requested and a rationale for this amount of time
17. Detailed work plan for the period of the requested extension
> If necessary, what survey activities will take place when to determine the actual 
location, size and other characteristics of mined areas? 
> How much will be released during each year of the extension period? (e.g., How 
much area? How many areas? Which areas? How will priorities be established?)
> What demining, survey and other land release methods and what standards applied?
> What is the annual cost and for what?
> What are the expected sources of funding / other resources to implement the plan?
> What assumptions are made regarding the realisation of the plan?
> What are potential risk factors that may affect realisation of the plan?
18. Institutional, human resource and material capacity
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